argue in this essay that individual expectations about old age have not suf½ciently adjusted to the new reality of an aging society. Reflecting this, our private, public, and societal institutions suffer from the same disconnect and now need to adapt considerably to face the challenges and embrace the opportunities of demographic change. Although this adaptation must focus es pecially on work patterns among the "younger elderly," our entire society has to adapt its attitudes toward work organization and labor-force participation, and in the process rethink its education and health care policies and expectations.
In this essay, we will describe some of the often understated bene½ts that working and remaining active may have for health and well-being in older populations. Furthermore, it is often claimed that an older workforce has negative implications for general productivity and displaces younger workers from positions they would otherwise occupy. We will show that this is a misconception emerging from the "lump-ofla bor" fallacy: the idea that the amount of work available to laborers is ½xed. We maintain that it is not demographic transitions per se that will shape our future, but instead how our institutions and policies respond and adapt to them. It is our choice.
Individual expectations about old age tend to be formed by looking to history. Our intuition about health and workability at older ages stems to a large extent from the experiences of our parents and grandparents. Our expectations about what Social Security should deliver to us stem from what Social Security delivered to previous generations. We have a hard time imagining, however, what our lives will look like in twenty-½ve or ½fty years: how long we will live, how healthy we will be by then, and under how much pressure Social Security will be. We will address all of these issues, beginning with the salient points about Social Security (a more detailed discussion of which may be found in S. Jay Olshansky, Dana P. Goldman, and John W. Rowe's essay in this volume.)
At the time Social Security was established in 1935, sixty-½ve was commonly the age U.S. citizens received other government bene½ts. (It is important to recall that life expectancy for American men from 1935 to 1940 was about sixty years.) Table 1 shows the dramatic changes in life ex pectancy that have taken place since thenchanges that have been reported in many articles and studies, but that appear not to have entered our collective wealth of selfevident facts on which individual actions and general policy are based.
In the mid-twentieth century, just over half of all Americans who reached the age of twenty-one could expect to reach sixty½ve. Many workers paying into Social Security would never live long enough to receive bene½ts, especially African Americans, whose life expectancy was just over ½fty in 1935. Today, however, men who retire at age sixty-½ve can expect to live for an additional seventeen years; women live even longer. 1 Average life expectancies have risen so sharply since 1935 that it is no surprise that Social Security-and our expectations about what old age looks like-have been unable to keep up.
Signi½cantly, there is also evidence for a substantial increase in healthy and disability-free life expectancy; that is, the num ber of years men and women can expect to live without major functional limitations. Despite some controversy, the gen eral trend appears clear: over the past decades, as life expectancy has improved in the United States, so too has healthy or disability-free life expectancy. When life expectancy improves and morbidity and disability decease, this leads to "compression of morbidity," or a longer part of life spent in good health and a shorter number of years lived in ill health. Most studies show that a signi½cant compression of mor bidity has occurred over the last decades in the United States, making it clear that many-although not all-Americans are able to work until after current retirement ages or eligibility for Social Security. 2 Yet some evidence suggests that compression of morbidity has stagnated in recent years. Even more concerning are current hints that the middle-aged and the "young old" are showing increases in morbidity and functional limitations not evident in earlier cohorts that grew old between 1990 and the present. A closer look at the evidence shows that good health at older ages is strongly predicted by educational attainment and other indicators of socioeconomic status. In a recent study, pub lic health researcher David Rehkopf and colleagues projected the future employment potential for the near-elderly workforce based on demographic trends and trends in mobility and functional status from the 1982-2004 National Long Term Care Study and the 1992-2010 Health and Retirement Study. 3 Rehkopf's projections through 2050 focus speci½c attention on educational differences. His group concludes-based on multiple scenarios of population trends in disabilitythat those with a high school diploma have generally a high and consistent potential to work productively between the ages of ½fty-½ve and seventy-four. The estimates suggest that under most scenarios, about 70 percent of those with at least a high school diploma will be able to work in this age range. These ½ndings are generally in line with studies done by economist David M. Cutler and others, who assume no huge upward turns in disability prevalence, even with modest or no improvements in active life expectancy. 4 But the same is not true for those with low levels of education. Rehkopf's team sug gests that if less favorable trends continue for men and women without a high school diploma, this group could have depressed levels of ability to work at older ages. 5 These estimates vary much more depending on different assumptions about trends, but they range from just over 0 percent to 60 percent in the most optimistic circumstances. Of course, new medical tech nologies could alter these trends by providing more support to those with limitations. Furthermore, patterns of immi gration bringing in more or less educated young and middle-aged adults could also change these estimates. But The dramatic demographic changes depicted in Table 1 imply that most men, and even more women, will now survive early childhood and mid-adulthood to reach old er ages, meaning that larger and larger numbers of older men and women will reach eligibility for Social Security. When most retirement and other age-related policies were established, they made sense in terms of the current life expectancy. Today they do not. These demographic changes point to the necessity of institutional adaptation. Among industrialized nations, the United States does not have the largest disparity between life expectancy and retirement age. France and Italy, for example, set the age of early retirement earlier than the United States' (often between ½fty-½ve and sixty), even though they enjoy greater life expectancy than the United States does. Thus, the time from retirement to death is decades long in France and Italy, creating a large imbalance between work patterns and demographic reality. In response, France and Italy have joined the growing number of European countries adapting their statutory retirement ages, although only for future cohorts and with many exceptions. Germany, for instance, has confronted this challenge through a variety of policy adjustments: First, it introduced penalties for early retirement that were gradually phased in between 2000 and 2010. Second, it abolished some special tracks for early retirement, including the differential treatment of men and women (who previously could retire earlier despite their longer life expectancy). Third, the stat utory retirement age began gradually shifting in 2013 by about a month per year to reach a target of age sixty-seven by 2029 -roughly in line with the expected increase in the length of life. These adaptations have met much resistance. Accommodating pop ular opinion, the German gov ernment reintroduced a pathway to early re tire ment at age sixty-three. France and Italy have seen similar policy reversals, backtracking from modest increases in statutory retire ment ages to early retirement op tions. Pub lic anxiety about increased retirement age clearly shows the need to overcome pop ular misconceptions about actual and fu ture life expectancy and health in older ages.
The United States has done part of its home work and is ahead of Europe in its preparations. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 legislated a gradual shift in the eligibility age for normal Social Security bene½ts. It will not be suf½cient, however, to bring the U.S. Social Security system back into actu arial balance. Thus, a steeper path to changing the average worker's eligibility ages is still necessary.
In addition, given the reality of a divide in the health of America's older population, it is critical to create differentiated paths to retirement and labor-force exits depending upon health (which in turn of -ten depends on economic and social ex periences earlier in life). This life-course fork in long-term trajectories suggests that options for early retirement based on work disability are critical to maintaining intragen erational equity between those who can work longer and those who cannot. A onesize-½ts-all Social Security reform will not do; only a differentiated approach will avoid the political backlashes observed in Europe. This may mean the implementation of both a general retirement age that is indexed in some way to life expectancy and an early-retirement option based on the ability to work. For older workers in poor health, it is obviously better for their health and well-being not to have to work. This may mean that certain groups within the population-such as the less educated and those with very physically demanding jobs-may need the option to take an early path to retirement. Current Social Security policies enabling people to start collecting bene½ts around age sixty-two may be a good model for workers in this group. Those with better functioning or with limitations that do not interfere with their performance could have longer working lives and continue to make substantial contributions to productivity in U.S. society.
Adapting the retirement age to a longer life has many implications. We note, as others in this volume have, that these do not exclusively affect the elderly. First, the ability of future generations to work longer hinges on their education and health throughout life. Additionally, since the United States will have a larger number of retirees in the future than ever before, the younger and middle-aged will have to be better-educated and in better health than they are today in order to carry this additional actuarial burden (regardless of how many older people keep working). To optimize our chances of providing a healthier workforce at older ages, we must adopt a life-course approach that focuses on the social experiences and behaviors of men and women across all ages. For example, the men and women who will be in their sixties and seventies in 2030 to 2050 are in early to mid-adulthood now. Their current health and social conditions are therefore shaping their capacity and the opportunities for employment options they will have at age sixty, seventy, or eighty. The point is even stronger for education because of the many implications a poor education has on opportunities over the entire course of life. We have no time to lose if we hope to change trajectories of work and retirement.
Debates about our aging society too quickly end up foundering on the issue of Social Security reform and the well-being of the elderly, while tending to ignore the necessity of creating better starting positions for the young. Macroeconomic an alyses show that education and health care reform have more leverage in shaping our society's ability to create new jobs, foster better working conditions, and encourage labor-force participation (and thus, indirectly, improve the ½nancial position of Social Security) than an adapted retirement age and disability insurance reform. 6 Other studies suggest that recessions have differential impacts on health in the long run, with disadvantages accruing to particularly vulnerable age groups. 7 In any argument about retirement, it is important to discuss the implications of working at older ages. In general, being em ployed is positively associated with health. There are many reasons for this relationship, the most obvious being health selection; that is, healthy people are more likely to be able to work. However, there is growing evidence that employment itself actively yields both physical and mental health bene½ts. Here, we will explore ½nd -ings suggesting that employment may im -prove health and well-being by increasing social engagement; developing and maintaining intellectual and interpersonal skills; and, importantly, continuing to earn and delaying the use of savings, pensions, and other bene½ts. This phenomenon has obvious implications for retirement, since neg ative effects of retirement are often ignored in the cost-bene½t analysis that is done when a state attempts to determine the optimal retirement age.
Retirement introduces large changes to an individual's life. While there is little doubt that poorer health is associated with early retirement, studies on the health impact of retirement have so far reached no consensus on whether retirement promotes or harms health. Differentiation is essential in conducting these studies: phys ically and psychologically strenuous work conditions are unlikely to be good for a person's health, while working in a rewarding and healthy environment may be better for mental and physical health than leaving the workforce. Many of the existing studies have faced methodological problems: they do not distinguish the effects of aging from those of retirement and they often do not distinguish the effects of retirement from those of previous life experiences or conditions that themselves influence retirement decisions. Many of the descriptive studies lack an ad equate control or comparison group. This is important because the decision to retire is not random: there is a self-selection issue. For instance, those who are ill are more likely to retire early. Those with great wealth may also retire early. However, illness may be caused by environmental conditions and wealth by enhanced educational opportunities. Thus, in both cases, retirement is not causally linked to health or wealth but to previous life experiences and conditions. In addition, the effects of retirement on health may depend on many contextual factors, including the adequacy of retirement bene½ts, as well as individual factors such as occupation, socioeconomic status, and marital status. Retirement may also have different effects on physical and mental health, requiring the need for further differentiation in the methodology of studies on retirement.
The literature on this question has focused on understanding how reforms on the age of retirement-namely, the age of compulsory retirement or the minimum age of retirement-might impact health. These laws have a strong effect on retirement decisions: while a substantial proportion of workers retire before the statutory age of retirement, a higher statutory retirement age encourages individuals to work longer. Here we focus on a small (but growing) set of studies that have attempted to establish causality between the statutory retirement age and retirement's effects on health. We will examine two pieces of evidence that are important in this respect: First, we discuss some of the studies using longitudinal data to assess how retirement influences health, taking into account the complex set of factors that lead individuals into retiring early. Sec ond, we discuss the evidence of the health impact of retirement age-related policy reforms.
Longitudinal studies follow the health of workers during the years prior, during, and after retirement and compare it to the health trajectories of workers who continue to work. Using data from employees from the French companies Électricité de France and Gaz de France (edf-gdf; also called the gazel cohort), epidemiologist and gerontologist Hugo Westerlund and colleagues found that between the year before and the year after retirement, the prevalence of poor self-rated health fell from 19 percent to 14 percent. 8 These health improvements were stronger for workers with a poor work environment before re -tirement. Using data from the Whitehall II study of British civil servants, epidemiologist Gill Mein and colleagues found that although mental health improved after re tirement, physical functioning did not appear to change. 9 Mental health improvements, however, were con½ned to highgrade employees. In a reexamination of the data, epidemiologist and social scientist Markus Jokela and colleagues found that compulsory retirement at age sixty and early voluntary retirement were associated with improvements in mental health and physical functioning. 10 In contrast, retirement due to ill health was associated with poorer mental health and physical functioning. Their ½ndings highlight the important role of health-related selection as a potential explanation of the negative association between retirement and health. Many of the studies referenced above, which are con½ned to European populations, cast doubt on the notion that retirement is bad for health overall: the prevailing ½nding appears to be that in the short term, retirement is associated with an improvement in mental health and little or no change (but no clear evidence of harm) to physical health; though there is no doubt that the effect of retirement depends on the nature of the worker's oc cupa tion and health prior to retirement.
More recently, studies have used differences across cohorts in eligibility for retirement bene½ts (based on legislation on statutory retirement or pensionable ages) to iso late the effects of retirement on health. Economist Kerwin Ko½ Charles has used policy variation in mandatory retirement and Social Security bene½ts that influence retirement incentives by age and cohort in the United States to examine the impact of retirement on depression. 11 He found that retirement leads to better mental health and well-being. Other studies ex ploit variations across countries in the age of eligibility for early and full retirement bene½ts. Based on these variations, economists Norma B. Coe and Gema Za mar ro found that retirement leads to a short-term decrease in the probability of reporting poor health, and a long-lasting improvement in the overall health in dex. 12 It is nonetheless important to distinguish general health from cognitive abilities, which appear to bene½t from working at older ages. The impact of retirement on cognitive function is of particular interest in view of the "use it or lose it" hypothesis, which suggests that age-related cognitive decline can be lessened through engagement in cognitively demanding activities. 13 This suggests that individuals whose work is cognitively demanding may bene½t from later retirement. Using data from the Whitehall II study, B. A. Roberts and colleagues found that workers who retired experienced smaller improvements in mean cognitive test scores than continuously employed workers, although these differences were not signi½cant for most cognitive test scores. 14 A seminal paper by psychologist Stéphane Adam and colleagues, based on the Study of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (share), found that cognition-measured mainly by memory abilities such as delayed word recall-declined during retirement. 15 This ½nding has given rise to an entire literature. Economists Susann Rohwedder and Robert J. Willis compared studies of retirement from Europe, the United States, and Britain and found that early retirement has a negative effect on cognitive ability. 16 Their ½ndings, however, are not corroborated by other studies. Based on data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (hrs), Coe and colleagues ex amined employers that offered early retire ment windows and found that time in re tirement was unrelated to cognitive function among white-collar workers, but may have a positive effect on cognitive function among blue-collar workers. 17 More recent studies based on European data, however, show that early retirees suffer from fast er cognitive decline than later retirees. 18 Based on the hrs, sociologist Esteban Calvo and colleagues found that the effect of retirement depends on the timing: those retiring before age sixty-two seem to fare worse than those who continue to work; yet, retirement at age sixty-two or older is not associated with worse physical and mental health. 19 Again, these studies have generally not found any negative effects of retirement on physical or mental health. Other studies have also found that retirement has no impact on mortality. 20 The studies discussed above reflect the variety of approaches to determining the health effects of retirement. What do these results tell us about the potential impact of recently enacted policies to increase retirement age for future generations across many countries? On the one hand, there seems to be little evidence that retirement harms physical health or increases the risk of dying. Although some studies do suggest that retirement may be bene½cial to mental health, distinguishing between different cohorts is again paramount: several studies suggest that the mental health consequences of retirement depend on the working environment and type of job the retiree had. While retirement does ap pear to bene½t the mental health of many working in strenuous conditions and performing manual labor, this is less clear for work ers in white-collar positions and with healthy work environments. Finally, the more recent evidence tends to ½nd some support for the hypothesis that retiring later helps individuals maintain better cognitive function.
What effects will delayed retirement have on the greater population and the young in particular? Higher rates of laborforce participation in older individuals is often said to have negative side effects for the economy as a whole. For many years, common sense suggested that the number of jobs in the economy is ½nite, and that a new population entering the labor force would therefore push other workers out. This so-called lump-of-labor fallacy has been invoked at moments in history when women's labor-force participation increased, because it was thought that they would take "good jobs" away from men. Immigrants to the United States con tinue to be accused of stealing jobs from other, native lower-wage workers. Likewise, many older people who wish to continue working today are accused of taking jobs from younger workers, creating intergenerational conflict. The lump-of-labor fallacy is one of the most damaging myths in economics. 21 It is deeply rooted in the belief that the economy resembles a small enterprise with a small, ½xed number of clients and a ½xed demand for its product. Such an enterprise has a set amount of output based on demand, and therefore can only use a certain amount of labor. This is a poor analogue to a suf½ciently large and complex economy. This is shown most clearly in the United States, where the sharp increase in female labor-force participation not only did not cause mass un employment for men, but actually correlated with a rise in male employment rates. More speci½cally, recent ½ndings from cross-national comparisons show that high er employment of older individuals is actually positively correlated with higher em ployment of the young; that is, countries with a high prevalence of early re tire ment tend to have higher unemployment rates and lower employment of the young. 22 Figure 1 shows a correlation between early retirement and youth unemployment in oecd countries. These ½ndings may be challenged, however, as many confounding factors operate at the same time in the aggregate data. Strong and isolated re forms are more suitable for empirically identifying the effects of pension policies on labormarket outcomes for the young. It is therefore instructive to examine the impact of speci½c pension reforms on employment rates at different ages.
Germany provides a particularly neat case, since strong and isolated reforms in the years 1972, 1984, and 1998 dramatically changed retirement incentives. 23 Figure 2 depicts the labor-force participation rates for four age groups in Germany, and Figure  3 presents the corresponding unemployment rates. These ½gures reveal three important facts. First, the 1972 reform dramatically reduced retirement age, laborforce participation, and employment of old er individuals. In spite of this, youth em ployment did not increase. Second, the "bridge to retirement" legislation introduced in 1984 substantially increased the unemployment rate of those aged ½fty-½ve to ½fty-nine, since unemployment insurance bene½ts were used as substitutes for early retirement pen sions. Yet youth employment did not rise in response. The phasing-in of "actuarial" adjustments after 1998 re versed the trend of early retirement. Em ployment in creased from 30 percent to 40 percent in those aged sixty to sixtyfour. There is a very slight concurrent decrease in employ ment of the young.
The ½rst two cases are clear-cut: employment of the young and the old moved in tandem. But the third case may appear to contradict this relationship. Axel BoerschSupan and economist Reinhold Schnabel, however, have shown in their regression analysis of the third case that the slight decrease in employment of the young is in fact a re flection of the business cycle and not a response to the introduction of actuarial adjustments. 24 The German analysis is part of the work by an international team that used pensiondesign changes in eleven countries to identify how changes in the employment of old er individuals has affected the employment of the young. The results vary considerably across speci½cations, but in these studies there are many more cases that refute the lump-of-labor hypothesis than cases that support it. As economists Jonathan Gruber and David Wise have written:
The overwhelming weight of the evidence, as well as the evidence from each of the several different methods of estimation, is contrary to the "boxed economy" proposition. We ½nd no evidence that increasing the employment of older persons will reduce the employment opportunities of youth and no evidence that increasing the em ployment of older persons will increase the unemployment of youth. 25 Countries have large multifaceted economies that cannot be likened to small companies with ½xed, "boxed" labor needs. National economies can grow, increasing the demand for all goods and services and therefore also the demand for labor. As with women and immigrants, the increasing entry of older workers into the workforce contributes to a vital and productive economy. Moreover, unless a pension system is fully funded, there is a tax cost for retirement-whether early or not-that must be spread over the entire economy. This raises the total labor compensation em ployers must pay for all workers, including the young. The greater the number of older workers that leave the workforce, therefore, the more likely it is that the employment prospects of the young will worsen.
Increases in life expectancy and compression of morbidity, funding de½cits in Social Security, possible cognitive bene½ts to work ing at older ages, and the potential for economic vitalization are some of the factors that support increasing the number of individuals who work past today's statutory retirement age. It would be naive to expect that this will occur only through Social Security reform and legislation encouraging workers to work longer; we also need structural policy changes that gen erate a healthier and more productive America. These include policies that invest in human capital throughout individuals' lives, thus enabling them to work longer; such as policies on early childhood, education, employment protection, work flex ibility, income support, poverty reduction, and health care access. 26 Most individuals should not ex perience deterioration of men tal and phys ical health from working longer; rather, the goal is to support healthy aging in such a way that working will be more feasible and potentially flexible for older cohorts. Only through policies that promote life trajectories leading to healthy aging will we be able to create a workforce able to work longer, and only then will we be able to accrue the true societal bene½ts of So cial Security re form.
How we adapt the major U.S. institutions related to work organization and laborforce participation will shape our future as we move through this demographic transition. Although shaping public and pri vate policies is of paramount importance, this adaptation must take place on all levels, such as with more in formal workplace practices. These policies and practices shape patterns of labor-force participation for older men and women and determine how they will pursue retire ment. These policies must also take into account that each older generation is a diverse set of men and women with different life-course patterns of education, skills, family constellations, and health conditions, and that this in turn affects the em ployment op -portunities they will have at older ages. Also determining outcomes of labor policy changes are the social, economic, and health capital of Americans in the labor force, currently and in the future. These two sets of conditions-one at the laborpolicy level and the other at the population level (related to the capacity of individuals)-will determine whether we remain a resilient and successful society as we experience the aging of our population.
